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the dual purposes of international agreements on civil liability for 
nuclear damages, ensuring victim compensation for transnational 
damages and safeguarding the long-term viability of the nuclear 
power industry from liability for nuclear accidents by establishing 
rules to control industry liability.  Particular emphasis is placed on 
the impact of the CSC on the two major users of nuclear power in the 
CSC, the United States. and Japan.  While there are valid concerns 
about the provisions of all international agreements on nuclear 
liability, including the CSC, this paper argues that the CSC effectively 
controls industry liability but will likely prove to be of little impact 
for domestic victims in either the United States. or Japan. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
With Japan’s ratification of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA)-affiliated Convention on Supplementary 
Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) on January 15, 2015, the 
CSC took effect on April 15, 2015, the newest international 
agreement in the labyrinthine world of nuclear damage compensation 
agreements.1  International agreements on civil liability for nuclear 
damages, of which the CSC is one, are designed to ensure victim 
compensation for transnational damages and safeguard the long-term 
viability of the nuclear power industry from liability for nuclear 
accidents by establishing rules to control industry liability.2  This 
paper analyzes the impact of the CSC in light of these two purposes, 
with particular emphasis on the impact of the CSC on the two major 
users of nuclear power in the CSC, the United States and Japan.  The 
main proponents of the CSC are national governments, who highlight 
its ability to be a truly global treaty system, promote victim 
compensation through provisions stronger than other treaties which 
have taken effect, and control industry liability.3  Critics of the CSC 
such as Prof. Currie and the Japan Federation of Bar Associations 
assert that, while it provides better protection for victims that some 
                                                                                                               
 1 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Sept. 29, 1997, 
36 I.L.M. 1473 (entered into force Apr. 15, 2015),   https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/
infcirc567.pdf [https://perma.cc/YNK2-D27Q] [hereinafter CSC]; Latest Status of the 
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY 
AGENCY [IAEA] (Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Conventions/supcomp_status.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8Z7-JFHK] [hereinafter CSC Latest 
Status]; Japan Joins the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, 
INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY [IAEA] (Jan. 16, 2015), https://www.iaea.org/
newscenter/news/japan-joins-convention-supplementary-compensation-nuclear-damage 
[https://perma.cc/4CAU-MYBK]. 
 2 Julia Schwartz, International Nuclear Third Party Liability Law: The Response to 
Chernobyl, in INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LAW IN THE POST-CHERNOBYL PERIOD, 
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT NUCLEAR ENERGY 
AGENCY [NEA], at 37, 39 (2006), https://www.oecd-nea.org/law/chernobyl/nea6146-iaea-
chernobyl.pdf [https://perma.cc/UK48-CUJU]. 
 3 S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 109-15, at 1–2 (2006), https://www.congress.gov/109/crpt/erpt15/
CRPT-109erpt15.pdf [https://perma.cc/QPK5-QLLX]; Terabayashi Yūsuke ( ), 
Genshiryoku Songai Hokanteki Hoshō Joyaku (CSC) Teiketsu ni tsuite (
 (CSC) ) [Regarding Accession to the Convention on 
Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC)], 361 RIPPŌ TO CHŌSA (
) [LEGISLATION AND SURVEYS] 42, 53 (2015), http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/annai/
chousa/rippou_chousa/backnumber/2015pdf/20150202042.pdf [https://perma.cc/WWT7-
23UQ] [hereinafter House of Councilors Report]. 
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other treaties, limits on damages, concentration of claims in the 
country in which an accident occurs, short statutes of limitations, and 
poor membership in the treaty systems mean that it is still deficient.4 
While there are valid concerns about the provisions of all 
international agreements on nuclear liability, including the CSC, this 
paper argues that the CSC effectively controls industry liability but 
will likely prove to be of little impact for domestic victims in either 
the United States or Japan.  The provisions of international 
agreements which limit liability for nuclear damages by 
concentrating liability on operators of nuclear reactors are favorable 
to exporters of nuclear technology.  However, the CSC also does not 
substantially alter the compensation system for domestic accidents 
for victims in the United States or Japan because it only establishes 
minimum standards which national legislation can and does exceed 
in both and United States and Japan and provides a relatively minor 
amount of additional compensation.  In addition, both states are less 
likely to suffer transnational nuclear damages due to their 
comparatively isolated geographical location as compared to 
European states. 
First this paper will examine the history of international 
agreements on civil liability for nuclear damages, reviewing the terms 
of the three treaty systems, the Paris Convention, the Vienna 
Convention and the CSC and investigating the reasons that states join, 
or do not join, these regimes.  Second, this paper will describe the 
U.S. system for the compensation of nuclear damage and the changes 
made to it to implement the CSC.  Third, this paper will do the same 
for the Japanese nuclear damage compensation system.  Fourth, this 
paper will then show how the CSC protects the nuclear industry from 
heavy liability but does little to expand victim protection.  Lastly this 
                                                                                                               
 4 Duncan E. J. Currie, The Problems and Gaps in the Nuclear Liability Conventions 
and an Analysis of How an Actual Claim Would Be Brought under the Current Existing 
Treaty Regime in the Event of a Nuclear Accident, 35 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 85, 85 
(2006); “Genshiryoku Songai no Baishō ni kansuru Hōritsu” oyobi “Genshiryoku Songai 
no Hokanteki Hoshō ni kansuru Jōyaku” ni kansuru Ikensho (
) [Opinion 
on the “Act of Compensation for Nuclear Damage” and “Convention on Supplementary 
Compensation for Nuclear Damage], NIHON BENGOSHI RENGŌKAI ( ) 
[JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS] (Aug. 22, 2014), at 1, http://www.nichibenren.or.
jp/library/ja/opinion/report/data/2014/opinion_140822_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2M4-
A5MF] [hereinafter August 2014 JFBA Opinion]. 
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paper will introduce the IAEA’s suggestions for improving the 
current regime. 
II. PROVISIONS AND HISTORY 
This section will introduce the provisions and history of the 
CSC and the Conventions which proceeded it, the Paris Convention, 
the Brussels Supplementary Compensation, and the Vienna 
Convention, noting the current fragmented nature of the network of 
international agreements and how this limits their utility.  This section 
will also show how the diverse interests of the parties caused this 
fragmentation.  A more focused analysis of how the terms of the CSC 
accomplish the goals of international agreements on civil liability and 
change the nuclear damage compensation systems of the United 
States and Japan will be conducted later in this paper. 
As previously mentioned, such international agreements are 
designed to address the compensation of transnational damages.5  In 
a world without international agreements addressing liability for 
transnational nuclear damage, liability would be governed by the 
domestic law of the nations involved.  Most nations have laws that 
remove liability for damage from nuclear power from the normal law 
of tort and concentrate liability on the operator of the nuclear power 
plant.6  At the outset of the nuclear age in the 1950s and 1960s, states 
interested in promoting the peaceful use of atomic energy determined 
that the ordinary rules of tort law would on one hand inhibit victims 
from showing which parties were liable for their harm and on the 
other expose nuclear operators, builders, and suppliers, etc., to 
uninsurable liability.7  As such, they established certain common 
basic principles of liability for nuclear damages: (i) operators of 
nuclear power plants should be exclusively liable for nuclear 
damages, (ii) they should be strictly liable for nuclear damages, (iii) 
their liability should be limited in amount, (iv) their liability must be 
financially secured, for example through insurance, and (v) their 
liability should be limited in time.8  The earliest example of this was 
                                                                                                               
 5 Schwartz, supra note 2, at 39. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Schwartz, supra note 2, at 39–41. 
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the 1957 Price-Anderson Act in the United States.9  Japan passed its 
Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage in 1963.10  These two 
pieces of legislation have similarities, but differ in several important 
respects which will be discussed in detail later in this paper. 
From these early days of the development of nuclear power 
some nations, in particular the densely populated nations of Western 
Europe with many neighboring states, have desired to address the 
potential mess of conflicting laws that would govern a nuclear 
accident that caused transnational damages by entering into 
international agreements that delineate which state’s law will apply 
to an accident as the rules on conflicts of laws differ between states.11  
The core features of such agreements are that they (i) provide that the 
law governing liability for nuclear damages is the law of the state in 
which the nuclear accident occurred, (ii) provide for exclusive 
jurisdiction over claims regarding liability for such accident in the 
courts of the state in which the accident occurred, and (iii) require 
that parties to the agreement bring their domestic law into 
conformance with principles mentioned above, though the precise 
requirements vary in important respects.12  Also, some international 
agreements only cover nuclear damage suffered in states party to the 
agreement in question.13 
The first such agreement was the Paris Convention, open only 
to OECD members or other states as allowed by a vote of the 
members of the OECD, which was signed in 1960 and took effect in 
1968.14  Membership of the Paris Convention focuses in Europe.15  It 
                                                                                                               
 9 Act to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (Price-Anderson), Pub. L. No. 85-256, 
71 Stat. 576 (1957). 
 10 Genshiryoku Songai no Baishō ni kansuru Hōritsu (
) [Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage], Law No. 147 of 1961, http://law.e-
gov.go.jp/htmldata/S36/S36HO147.html [https://perma.cc/GX86-MWSJ] (Japan) 
[hereinafter ACND]. 
 11 Schwartz, supra note 2, at 41. 
 12 Id. at 43. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960, 
956 U.N.T.S. 251 (entered into force Apr. 1, 1968), http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/
unts/volume%20956/volume-956-i-13706-english.pdf [https://perma.cc/9T8R-TP3M] 
[hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
 15 Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability: Latest Status of Ratifications or 
Accessions, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT NUCLEAR 
ENERGY AGENCY [NEA] (July 30, 2015), https://www.oecd-nea.org/law/paris-convention-
ratification.html [https://perma.cc/9WF6-HX66] [hereinafter Paris Convention Latest 
Status]. 
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was followed shortly thereafter by the Vienna Convention, an 
agreement open to any state, which was signed in 1963 and took 
effect in 1977.16  Vienna Convention membership concentrates in 
Latin America and the Middle East.17  The Paris Convention was also 
strengthened by the Brussels Supplementary Convention, which 
created the first framework for a supplementary compensation fund 
consisting of contributions from state parties in the event of nuclear 
damage in excess of the minimum amount of liability an operator 
would be subject to under the Paris Convention.18  However, the 
United States was unable to join either Convention without 
significant amendments to U.S. law because of several differences 
between U.S. law and the requirements for entry to the two 
Conventions.19 
These agreements are still the bedrock of the international 
regime for the compensation for transnational nuclear damages and a 
brief review of their core terms is necessary in understanding the role 
of the CSC.20   Both treaties are only applicable only within the 
territory of the contracting parties.21  Jurisdiction over claims arising 
under the Conventions lies only with the courts of the contracting 
party in which the nuclear incident occurred.22  Judgments entered by 
the competent court generally must be recognized and enforced by all 
                                                                                                               
 16 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 1063 
U.N.T.S. 265, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc500.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9L9D-9LM9] (entered into force Nov. 12, 1977) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 17 Latest Status of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, INT’L 
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY [IAEA] (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Conventions/liability_status.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RGV-RCDB] [hereinafter 
Vienna Convention Latest Status]. 
 18 Convention of 31st January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29th July 
1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Jan. 31, 1963, 1041 U.N.T.S. 
358 (entered into force Dec. 4, 1974), http://www.nea.fr/html/law/nlbrussels.html 
[https://perma.cc/A7Y2-WQC2] [hereinafter Brussels Supplementary Convention]. 
 19 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT 25 
(1999), https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/gcprod/documents/paa-rep.pdf [https://perma.cc/
B5H3-LQ58] [hereinafter 1999 DOE Report]. 
 20 The Paris Convention has sixteen parties with a total of 116 of the world’s 443 
civilian nuclear power plants. The Vienna Convention has forty parties with a total of 
seventy-six civilian nuclear power plants. Paris Convention Latest Status, supra note 15; 
Vienna Convention Latest Status, supra note 17; Operational Reactors by Country, INT’L 
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY [IAEA] (Feb. 14, 2016), https://www.iaea.org/PRIS/
WorldStatistics/OperationalReactorsByCountry.aspx [https://perma.cc/ENE3-AME8]. 
 21 Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 2; Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 11. 
 22 Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 13(a); Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 
11. 
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contracting parties. 23   The Convention and national law must be 
applied without discrimination based on nationality, domicile or 
residence.24  The Conventions define operator liability for nuclear 
damages as being for damage to or loss of life of any person and 
damage to or loss of property which is caused by a nuclear incident, 
except the operator’s property at the site of the nuclear installation.25  
Both Conventions provide for the strict and exclusive of liability of 
nuclear operators for nuclear damages where causation can be proved, 
with exceptions only for damage caused by nuclear incidents relating 
to acts of war or insurrection or, unless national legislation of the 
installation states otherwise, a grave natural disaster of an exceptional 
character.26  The Paris Convention provides that states may limit 
liability to not less than 5 million Special Drawing Rights (SDR) with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) but not more than 15 million 
SDR, and the Vienna Convention provides that states may limit 
liability to not less than U.S. $5 million.27  Financial security must be 
provided by the nuclear operator in such amount.28  The statute of 
limitations on claims for compensation is generally 10 years from the 
date of the incident, unless national law of a contracting party 
provides for insurance coverage for a longer period.29  The law of the 
competent court may provide for a statute of limitations of not less 
than three years from the date the victim had or should have had 
knowledge of the damage and the identity of the operator liable for 
the damage under the Paris Convention, and not less than two years 
                                                                                                               
 23 Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 13(d); Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 
12. 
 24 Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 14(a); Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 
13. 
 25 Paris Convention, supra note 14, arts. 1, 4; Vienna Convention, supra note 16, arts. 
1(j), 2. 
 26 Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 4; Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art 2. 
 27 Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 7; Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 5. 
Regarding SDR, see Rule O—Valuation of the SDR, Valuation of Currencies in Terms of the 
SDR, Freely Usable Currency, and Operational Budget, INT’L MONETARY FUND, 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bl/rr15.htm [https://perma.cc/YRJ6-Q5DC] (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2017).  One SDR is equal to approximately U.S. $1.35, as of January 2017.  
SDR Valuation, INT’L MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/rms_
sdrv.aspx [https://perma.cc/4NZ4-R8RG] (last visited Jan. 15, 2017, 2016). 
 28 Paris Convention, supra note 14, arts. 10(a), 15; Vienna Convention, supra note 16, 
art. 7. 
 29 Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 8(a); Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 6. 
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under the Vienna Convention.30  Nuclear operators have a right of 
recourse against third parties only where explicitly provided for by 
written agreement or where the accident was caused by the intentional 
act of an individual.31 
The Brussels Supplementary Convention, which limits 
membership to states also party to the Paris Convention, provides for 
two additional tiers of government funds for compensation beyond 
the first tier of compensation required in the Paris Convention in the 
event of an accident.32  The second tier is composed of public funds 
provided by the installation state in which an accident occurred in the 
amount of the difference between 175 million SDR and the minimum 
liability amount established by the installation state.33  The third tier 
is a fund of 125 million SDR provided by all contracting parties 
according to a pre-determined formula.34 
Chernobyl brought home the need for such agreements.  The 
1986 Chernobyl accident caused massive transnational nuclear 
damages, but it took place in the USSR, which was not party to any 
international agreement, had no special legislation on nuclear 
damages, and asserted it that it had no duty to provide compensation 
under international law. 35   While damages from Chernobyl were 
incurred as far away as the United States and Japan, the European 
states suffered the most damage and in the aftermath of the accident 
they moved to both expand the number of states party to international 
agreements and to make it easier for victims to recover for nuclear 
damages under the existing agreements.36 
One of the first measures was the ratification of the 1988 Joint 
Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and 
the Paris Convention, which grants coverage to a state party to it 
under the convention to which it is not already a party (either the Paris 
or Vienna Convention) and ensures that only one of either the Paris 
Convention or Vienna Convention will apply to a nuclear incident.37  
                                                                                                               
 30 Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 8(c); Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 
6(c). 
 31 Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 6(f); Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 10. 
 32 Brussels Supplementary Convention, supra note 18, art. 3(a). 
 33 Brussels Supplementary Convention, supra note 18, art. 3(b). 
 34 Brussels Supplementary Convention, supra note 18, art. 3(b). 
 35 Schwartz, supra note 2, at 37–38. 
 36 Id. at 43–44. 
 37 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris 
Convention, Sept. 21, 1988, 1672 U.N.T.S. 293 (entered into force Apr. 27, 1992), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss2/6
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Subsequently, proposals would be made to amend the Paris 
Convention, Vienna Convention, and Brussels Supplementary 
Convention in response to criticism that limits on liability under 
existing agreements were too low, that an additional compensation 
fund was necessary to cover damages in excess of operator liability, 
that existing statutes of limitations were too short, that additional 
types of damages must be covered, and that territorial scope should 
be widened.38 
Also, the United States was interested in joining an 
international regime covering liability for transnational nuclear 
damage but was unable to join either the Paris or Vienna Convention 
as U.S. law channels operator liability differently than the 
Conventions do and U.S. limits on liability are considerably higher 
than in either Convention.39  In the opinion of the Department of 
Energy, joining the CSC was meant to address concerns about 
ensuring compensation for nuclear accidents that occurred outside the 
United States and also promote commercial opportunities for U.S. 
firms to assist in the development of the safe use of nuclear power in 
developing states by providing them with the same rules channeling 
liability as firms from competing European states and Russia which 
were parties to the Paris and Vienna Conventions.40  Other states 
recognized that there would need to be a grandfather clause allowing 
the United States to join the CSC, a major goal if the agreement were 
to have global acceptance since the United States is the largest user 
                                                                                                               
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201672/v1672.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9NQB-CURE] [hereinafter Joint Protocol].  See generally Schwartz, supra note 2, at 45. 
 38 Protocol to Amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear 
Energy of 29 July 1960, as amended by the Additional Protocols of 28 January 1964 and by 
the Protocol of 16 November 1982, Feb. 12, 2004, http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/paris-
convention-protocol.html [https://perma.cc/J87W-45WE] (has not entered force) 
[hereinafter 2004 Protocol to Amend Paris Convention]; Protocol to Amend the Convention 
of 31 January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party 
Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 
January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 November 1982, Feb. 12, 2004 [hereinafter 2004 
Protocol to Amend Brussels Supplementary Convention], http://www.oecd-nea.org/
law/brussels_supplementary_convention.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HLS-YDTN] (has not 
entered force); Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage, Sept. 29, 1997, 2241 U.N.T.S. 302 (entered into force Oct. 4, 2003), 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%202241/v2241.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V653-E4KT] [hereinafter 1997 Revised Vienna Convention]; Currie, supra note 4, at 107. 
 39 1999 DOE Report, supra note 19, at 25. 
 40 Id. 
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of nuclear power.41  This was uncontroversial and the United States 
would play a critical role in the negotiations, preparing what would 
be the basis for the ultimate text of the CSC.42 
Despite a general consensus about the need for a more 
globally accepted regime with stronger victim protection provisions, 
amending the Conventions was a messy and drawn out process due 
to the conflicting interests of the parties.  As the Paris Convention 
was not designed to be open to non-OECD members, the IAEA-
affiliated Vienna Convention was addressed first, with the CSC, also 
developed under the aegis of the IAEA, being negotiated 
simultaneously and with the intent that it both complement the 
Vienna Convention in the manner the Brussels Supplementary 
Convention complements the Paris Convention and act as a more 
broadly applicable third treaty regime.43  The terms of the agreements 
are designed to be as similar as possible to promote the adoption of 
both.  Negotiations began on these two agreements in 1990.44 
The Explanatory Texts to the Revised Vienna Convention and 
the CSC point out several areas of conflict during negotiations.  The 
parties were not in agreement on the new, expanded definition of 
damages, largely as a result of different treatments in national law of 
economic losses and environmental damages.45  Also, while there 
was general agreement that the limits on compensation should be 
increased in the Vienna Convention and CSC, the amount the limits 
should be increased was so controversial it was left until the final 
stage of negotiations and eventually phase-in periods with reduced 
minimum liability amounts were adopted.46  Furthermore, one group 
of countries wanted to expand the geographical scope of coverage of 
damage to damage wherever suffered, not just the territory of the 
parties to the Convention, but this was controversial as it was seen to 
reduce the amount of compensation available for victims in the 
parties to the Convention, though it is also precisely the problem that 
                                                                                                               
 41 Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], The 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability 
for Nuclear Damage and the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage—Explanatory Texts, at 64–65, IAEA Doc. STI/PUB/1279 (2007), http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1279_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PAM-T4W9] 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention/CSC Explanatory Texts].  
 42 Id. at 65. 
 43 Schwartz, supra note 2, at 46. 
 44 Vienna Convention/CSC Explanatory Texts, supra note 41, at 34. 
 45 Id. at 34. 
 46 Id. at 43, 77. 
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arose in the Chernobyl accident. 47   Lastly, the terms of the 
supplementary compensation fund in the CSC were the most heavily 
debated provision.48  Originally the idea of a supplementary tier of 
compensation to which all parties would be required to contribute was 
rejected in the 1963 Vienna Convention because it was thought that 
such a provision would not be widely accepted since the primary 
beneficiaries of the fund would be victims in the state in which an 
accident took place. 49   Nuclear states, in particular the U.K. and 
France, objected to the reservation of funds in the supplementary fund 
for transnational damages because it violated the principle of non-
discrimination in the distribution of damages and was perceived as 
being unconstitutional in some states.50  Furthermore, non-nuclear 
states, namely New Zealand, objected to being required to make 
contributions to the supplementary fund as any nuclear accident could 
not be their fault.51 
A protocol to amend the Vienna Convention and the draft of 
the CSC were agreed in 1997.52  The Vienna Convention was the first 
of the original Conventions for which an amendment was proposed, 
and is the only one for which the amendment has taken effect.53  The 
minimum liability amount for nuclear operators was increased from 
U.S. $ 5 million to 300 million SDR.54  The statute of limitations for 
compensation claims for loss of life or personal injury was extended 
to 30 years and priority is given to such claims in the distribution of 
compensation where claims are brought within 10 years.55  The scope 
of compensable damages was expanded to cover a variety of 
additional environmental and economic damages, using the same 
                                                                                                               
 47 Id. at 29. 
 48 Id. at 19, 63. 
 49 Id. at 63. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 79. 
 52 Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 
Sept. 29, 1997, 2241 U.N.T.S. 302 (entered into force Oct. 4, 2003), https://www.iaea.org/
sites/default/files/infcirc566.pdf [https://perma.cc/YR8E-8XHX] [hereinafter 1997 Revised 
Vienna Protocol]. 
 53 Vienna Convention Latest Status, supra note 17; Latest Status of the Protocol to 
Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, INT’L ATOMIC 
ENERGY AGENCY [IAEA] (Nov. 26, 2015), https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Conventions/protamend_status.pdf [https://perma.cc/WF7V-EBMT] [hereinafter Revised 
Vienna Convention Latest Status]. 
 54 1997 Revised Vienna Protocol, supra note 52, art. 7. 
 55 1997 Revised Vienna Protocol, supra note 52, art. 8. 
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definition as the CSC (detailed below).56  The territorial scope of the 
Vienna Convention was extended to nuclear damage wherever 
suffered, though contracting parties may exclude damage suffered in 
non-contracting parties and their territorial waters by national 
legislation if such non-contracting party does not provide equivalent 
reciprocal benefits.57  Also, the exception to liability for grave natural 
disasters was removed.58 
As discussed above, the CSC is designed to both be a third 
nuclear damage liability regime open to states not party to either the 
Paris or Vienna Conventions as long as their national law met basic 
criteria and also serve as the equivalent of the Brussels 
Supplementary Convention for the parties of the Vienna 
Convention. 59   The CSC provides for a minimum national 
compensation amount of at least 300 million SDR and a 
supplementary compensation fund of about 300 million SDR 
contributed by the parties to the CSC which is to be drawn on by the 
installation state in which an accident occurred to compensate victims 
of a nuclear incident in the event that the first tier funds are 
exhausted.60 Contributions to the supplementary fund are based about 
90% on the nuclear power generating capacity of each party with the 
remainder based on the UN assessment of each party.61 
The CSC defines nuclear damages to include (a) loss of life 
or personal injury, (b) loss of or damage to property.62  The following 
are also included to the extent determined by the law of the competent 
court: (i) economic loss arising from the above (a) or (b), (ii) 
environmental reinstatement costs that are actually incurred or will 
be incurred, (iii) loss of income incurred as a result of a significant 
impairment of the environment, (iv) preventative measures, and (v) 
                                                                                                               
 56 1997 Revised Vienna Protocol, supra note 52, art. 2.  This definition is the same as 
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 57 1997 Revised Vienna Protocol, supra note 52, art. 3. 
 58 1997 Revised Vienna Protocol, supra note 52, art. 6. 
 59 CSC, supra note 1, art. 2; Japan Joins the Convention on Supplementary 
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compensation-nuclear-damage [https://perma.cc/4CAU-MYBK]. 
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any other economic loss permitted by the law of civil liability of the 
competent court.63 
Exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought under the CSC 
generally belongs to the courts of the party within whose territory or 
waters the incident occurs, with certain narrow exceptions. 64  
Compensation must be distributed equitably without discrimination 
on the basis of nationality, domicile or residence, though states may 
exclude nuclear damage suffered in a non-Contracting State subject 
to the limitations of other Conventions.65  Regarding compensation 
from the international supplementary compensation fund, 
compensation will only be provided for damage suffered in the 
territory of a party or other area with one of several possible sufficient 
connections to that state, such as its EEZ.66  50% of the compensation 
provided through the international supplementary compensation fund 
is prioritized for damage suffered outside of the territory of the 
installation state unless the state provides for not less than 600 million 
SDR of compensation under national law.67 
Parties to the CSC which are not also parties to either the Paris 
Convention or Vienna Convention must have national law consistent 
with the following principles, which are based on the Paris and 
Vienna Conventions.68  Liability for nuclear damage must be strictly 
and exclusively concentrated on the operator of the nuclear reactor 
which caused nuclear damage.69  There are exceptions to operator 
liability for nuclear damage directly due to an act of war or 
insurrection or, except where the law of the installation state provides 
otherwise, directly due to a grave natural disaster of an exceptional 
character. 70   Operator liability may be limited to as little as 300 
million SDR and operators must maintain financial security in such 
amount.71  If a state does not limit operator liability, then the amount 
of financial security may not be less than 300 million SDR.72  The 
period of extinction for claims under the CSC is generally 10 years, 
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however if under national law the liability of the operator is covered 
by insurance or other financial security or by State funds for a period 
longer than ten years this period may be extended up to the period for 
which the operator’s liability is covered.73  The law of the competent 
court may establish a period of prescription or extinction of not less 
than three years from the date a person suffering nuclear damage had 
knowledge of the damage and the operator liable for the damage.74  
The right of recourse of the operator against a third party is limited to 
cases where this is expressly provided for by written agreement or 
intentional acts or omissions by an individual.75 
In 2004 the parties to the Paris Convention and the Brussels 
Supplementary Convention agreed on protocols to amend both 
Conventions.76  These Protocols met with a decidedly unenthusiastic 
response and have not been ratified, but their proposed amendments 
are of value in analyzing the CSC as they provide for more 
compensation, but make it available to fewer victims and for fewer 
types of damages. 77   The minimum liability amount in the Paris 
Convention was raised, generally, to € 700 million from the previous 
maximum of 15 million SDR, and the exception to liability for grave 
natural disasters of an exceptional character was removed.78  The 
territorial scope of the Paris Convention was extended to include 
nuclear damage wherever suffered, though contracting parties may 
exclude with national legislation damage suffered in non-contracting 
parties if such non-contracting party does not provide equivalent 
reciprocal benefits.79  The Protocol added a definition of damages 
that is largely the same as that of the 1997 Revised Vienna Protocol, 
though it can be read to be somewhat more restrictive of economic 
loss.80  The statute of limitations on compensation claims for loss of 
                                                                                                               
 73 CSC, supra note 1, Annex art. 9(1). 
 74 CSC, supra note 1, Annex art. 9(3). 
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 76 2004 Protocol to Amend Paris Convention, supra note 38; 2004 Protocol to Amend 
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life or personal injury was extended to 30 years.81  The Protocol to 
Amend the Brussels Supplementary Convention increased the second 
tier of damages (provided by the installation state) from 175 million 
SDR to € 500 million, and the third tier (provided by all contracting 
parties) from 125 million SDR to € 300 million. 82   Unlike the 
Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention, in the Protocol to Amend 
the Brussels Supplementary Convention the territorial scope of 
damages covered is expanded only to cover the exclusive economic 
zone and continental shelf of contracting parties, not damages 
wherever suffered.83  This is because the compensation provided in 
the second and third tiers is provided by public funds and the parties 
didn’t want to make it so widely available.84 
Of the Revised Paris and Vienna Conventions, only the 
Revised Vienna Convention was actually ratified, and only by 13 
parties as comparted to the 40 parties of the original Vienna 
Convention. 85   The reaction to the CSC was likewise less than 
enthusiastic.  Only 13 states signed the CSC shortly after its 
publication, and only Argentina, Morocco, and Romania actually 
ratified the CSC shortly after signing it.86  Many signatories never 
ratified it, or took many years to ratify it, like the United States.87  
This meant that initially the CSC could not take effect, as it required 
ratification by at least five states with a combined 400,000 megawatts 
(MW) of installed nuclear power generating capacity.88 
While the United States played a key role in the drafting of 
the CSC, it took until 2008 for the CSC to be ratified by the United 
States.89   Part of the initial delay was because the CSC requires 
membership in the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which the United 
States was not a party to at the time the CSC opened for signature, 
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but ratified in 1999. 90   The CSC was eventually presented by 
President Bush to the Senate for ratification in 2002.91  Committee 
hearings began in 2005 and the CSC received the advice and consent 
of the Senate in 2006.92  The Senate noted that the CSC would ensure 
“prompt and adequate compensation” to victims of nuclear disasters 
and address the civil liability faced by U.S. exporters of nuclear 
technology.93  In ratifying the CSC, the United States emphasized 
that the CSC was consistent with the Price-Anderson Act and it 
balanced victim compensation with industry liability risks. 94   Of 
particular importance was the fact the CSC had the potential for 
global acceptance.95 
However the CSC was caught up in the process of amending 
energy law more generally, with a piece of omnibus legislation that 
included the implementing legislation for the CSC being hotly 
debated by both Houses of Congress and the Bush Administration, in 
particular over provisions relating to climate change and oil industry 
subsidies. 96   The result of this was that the Senate passed 
implementing legislation for the CSC several times, but the House of 
Representatives rejected these bills until it passed an omnibus energy 
bill called the Energy Independence and Security Act in 2007.97 
Debate over the CSC in the United States was framed in the 
context of a push by the Bush Administration to expand the use of 
nuclear power in the United States and abroad as a clean power 
source. 98   U.S. construction of nuclear power plants slowed 
dramatically after the 1970s as no new plants were ordered between 
1973 and 2012, though the NRC now has 12 applications for licenses 
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to operate nuclear power plants.99  The nuclear industry has also 
become much more globalized, with operator and supplier networks 
for U.S. nuclear plants no longer controlled by U.S. firms, with 
substantial cooperation between U.S. and Japanese firms. 100  
However, the level of U.S. exports of nuclear plant components, 
equipment, fuel, and technology had held steady since the mid-1990s, 
but U.S. market share has fallen significantly.101  Nevertheless, the 
21st Century has seen a rise in countries both large and small express 
interest in developing nuclear power plants.102  U.S. nuclear supplier 
Westinghouse had plans for 14 new nuclear reactors in China alone 
in the early 2000s and China had proposals for up to 80 more.103  In 
addition, India had plans for 12 plants.104 
Japan did not sign the CSC in 1997. 105   Initially, Japan 
considered the CSC unattractive because Japanese law was seen as 
providing a higher level of protection of victims, the Japanese 
government did not consider it likely that Japan would be involved in 
a nuclear accident with transnational effects, and none of Japan’s 
neighbors were party to any of the Conventions.106 
Japan’s interest in the CSC reemerged in the aftermath of the 
2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, culminating in Japan’s ratification 
of the CSC in 2015.107  With Japan’s ratification, the parties that had 
ratified the CSC collectively possessed over 400,000 MW of installed 
nuclear capacity and the CSC took effect in April 2015.108  According 
to a report produced by the House of Councilors, Japan’s change in 
position was due to a revaluation of the risks of nuclear power and 
renewed interest in providing legal predictability for the nuclear 
industry. 109   This report also emphasized that ratifying the CSC 
                                                                                                               
 99 PAUL K. KERR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MARY BETH K. NIKITIN & MARK HOLT, 
R41910, NUCLEAR ENERGY COOPERATION WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 
7–8 (2014). 
 100 Id. at 8. 
 101 Id. at 6. 
 102 Id. at 3. 
 103 Id. at 20. 
 104 Id. 
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would make it easier for the United States to provide assistance in the 
clean-up efforts at the Fukushima Daiichi reactor by assuaging the 
concerns about liability of U.S. firms. 110   The report also put 
particular emphasis on a belief that the modest terms of the CSC 
would help promote its adoption by the developing states of Asia that 
were endeavoring to launch a nuclear power industry.111  Indeed the 
IAEA notes that 60 countries are considering constructing nuclear 
power plants, and the IAEA forecasts that 10 to 24 countries will 
bring plants online by 2030.112   The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA) phrased Japan’s reasons for adopting slightly differently.113  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) advocated joining the CSC 
because it would enable a contribution to building an international 
compensation system for nuclear damages, improve compensation in 
the event of a nuclear accident, ensure swift and fair aid to victims, 
and improve in legal predictability by enacting international rules and 
improve the environment for related industries.114  MOFA has also 
emphasized the fact that the CSC is more compatible with the ACND, 
for example as regards definitions of damages and exceptions to 
liability, and that membership in the Paris and Vienna Conventions 
was concentrated in regions nowhere near Japan.115  Prof. Takashima 
suggests several additional reasons for Japan’s shift in position: the 
nuclear renaissance in Asia, the restructuring in the nuclear industry 
through acquisitions and collaboration in which Japanese industry 
has taken part, and the fact that the United States, with which the 
Japanese nuclear industry has close ties, joined the CSC system and 
was attempting to bring it into effect.116  There was also supposition 
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in the press that U.S. and Japanese firms were trying to compensate 
for declines in domestic performance with exports to developing 
countries.117 
Given the numerous, fundamental disagreements on the terms 
of the Revised Vienna Convention and the CSC even between the 
negotiating parties, it is unsurprising that ratification has not 
proceeded smoothly.  Nevertheless, the difficulty in gathering 
significant membership in any single treaty regime limits the utility 
of all of the treaties, including the CSC.118  As mentioned previously, 
states have long looked for a mechanism to clarify what law will 
apply when there are transnational damages from a nuclear accident 
and to ensure that their citizens obtain compensation for those 
damages.119  If there are insufficient parties to the Conventions then 
these objectives cannot be achieved, as was realized after the 
Chernobyl accident. 120   Indeed with membership fragmented 
between multiple conventions this problem largely remains. 
At present the membership in the Conventions is as follows.  
There are nine parties to the CSC, sixteen parties to the Paris 
Convention, and forty parties to the Vienna Convention (only 13 
ratified the Revised Vienna Convention).121  However the United 
States (99 reactors), Japan (43 reactors, many inactive pending 
approval), and India (22 reactors), all with substantial nuclear power 
industries, are party to the CSC.122  In total the parties to the CSC 
operate 169 reactors, the parties to the Paris Convention 116 reactors, 
and the parties to the Vienna Convention 76 reactors.123  Of the major 
nuclear powers, Canada, China (including Taiwan), South Korea, and 
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Switzerland are not party to any Convention, and they collectively 
operate 92 reactors.124 
It is therefore important to examine the reasons why 
membership in the Conventions has not grown.  One reason for 
failure of nuclear power generating countries to join the CSC was 
preferential treatment of plaintiffs from outside a state’s borders in 
distributions from the supplementary compensation fund.125  This 
was one of the matters of dispute during the negotiation process.126  
In addition, nuclear states objected to reserving half of the 
supplementary fund for transnational damages which may have 
occurred in states not party to the CSC.127  The drafting process also 
revealed disagreement on the proper scope of compensable 
damages.128  There also was disagreement over whether to cover 
damages wherever suffered, as the Vienna Convention does, or only 
in the parties to the Convention, as the CSC does.129  Furthermore, 
the parties to the Brussels Supplementary Convention, including 
France and the U.K., felt it would be too complex and duplicative to 
be part of both systems considering the different provisions of the 
agreements.130  Russian representatives have voiced concern that the 
presence of the CSC as a third legal regime to excessively fragment 
the legal framework. 131   Furthermore, the increased minimum 
liability amounts have encountered stiff resistance among the 
European states, and they were not even able to get sufficient 
ratification of the amended Paris Convention.132  For non-nuclear 
states, such as Austria and New Zealand, the provisions concentrating 
liability on nuclear operators and relieving suppliers of liability have 
precluded their ratification of any international agreement on this 
subject as they see such provisions as being overly protective of the 
nuclear industry.133  Furthermore, Europe is generally turning away 
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from nuclear power.  Germany has decided to phase out nuclear 
power.134  Italian voters rejected a bid by the government to revive 
nuclear power generation after a moratorium on new plants was put 
in place in the 1980s.135 
However there has been a new wave of interest in the modern 
agreements on the part of states interested in building a domestic 
nuclear power industry, with 4 states (including Japan) ratifying the 
CSC and 8 states ratifying the Revised Vienna Convention since 
2010.136  Many U.S. companies will only agree to export to parties to 
the CSC.137  The U.A.E., for example, acceded to the Revised Vienna 
Convention in 2012, 138  and the CSC in 2014, 139  after signing a 
contract for four nuclear reactors, notably with a South Korean firm 
not a U.S. firm, highlighting the role of the CSC as a part of the 
U.A.E’s commitment to the safe development of nuclear power.140  
In addition, India, keen to expand its use of nuclear power to meet its 
surging electricity demand, ratified the CSC in February 2016.141  
Negotiations had gone on for over 10 years with U.S. firms balking 
at Indian law which held suppliers liable for damages due to 
manufacturing defects and refusing to export to India unless India 
ratified the CSC. 142   While membership in the Conventions is 
expanding somewhat, it is still far from the ideal of a global regime 
imagined in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident. 
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III. U.S. NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION SYSTEM 
Before analyzing how well the CSC accomplishes its twin 
goals of promoting victim compensation and shielding operators 
from unbearable liability for accidents, a background in U.S. and 
Japanese law on the compensation of nuclear damage is necessary as 
these are the two main population centers in the CSC when it took 
effect.  In the United States, liability for nuclear damage is governed 
by the 1957 Price-Anderson Act (1957), which has been amended 
about every ten years since its passage and undergone significant 
changes since its passage.143 
The Price-Anderson Act defines the liability of anyone liable 
for “public liability,” which is defined as “any legal liability arising 
out of or resulting from a nuclear incident or precautionary 
evacuation.”144  This definition means that, in addition to the nuclear 
operator, other parties, such as suppliers, are still liable for nuclear 
damage, but the liability is channeled to the operator because these 
other parties are indemnified by the nuclear operator under his 
insurance coverage. 145   This is termed economic channeling, in 
contrast to the international standard of legal channeling discussed 
previously, in which the nuclear operator is deemed solely liable for 
all damages and nuclear damage is removed by statute from normal 
tort law.146 
Under the Price-Anderson Act, unless there is an 
“extraordinary nuclear occurrence” (ENO), nuclear operators are 
subject to the ordinary standards of liability.147  Unless the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) determines that there was an ENO, 
plaintiffs generally need to show that the damage caused to them was 
due to negligence or some other wrongful act unless state law 
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provides otherwise.148  The NRC has issued regulations defining an 
ENO based on criteria regarding radiation dose received, 
contamination levels for certain isotopes, and monetary damages.149 
The Price-Anderson Act allows the NRC to issue regulations 
requiring nuclear operators to waive certain tort law defenses to 
liability, de facto imposing strict liability.150  The NRC has issued 
regulations which apply this provision through the contractual terms 
of the indemnity agreements which nuclear operators are required to 
conclude with the NRC. 151   The indemnity agreement requires 
licensees to waive: 
(1) Any issue or defense as to the conduct of the 
claimant or the fault of the insureds, including but not 
limited to: 
(i) Negligence, 
(ii) Contributory negligence, 
(iii) Assumption of risk, and 
(iv) Unforeseeable intervening causes, whether 
involving the conduct of a third person, or an act 
of God, 
(2) Any issue or defense as to charitable or 
governmental immunity, and 
(3) Any issue or defense based on any statute of 
limitations if suit is instituted within three (3) years 
from the date on which the claimant first knew, or 
reasonably could have known, of his bodily injury or 
property damage and the cause thereof, but in no event 
                                                                                                               
 148 Ken Lerner & Edward Tanzman, Making Victims Whole: Compensation of Nuclear 
Incident Victims in Japan and the United States, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 543, 562 
(2014). 
 149 10 C.F.R. §§ 140.84, 140.85 (2002). 
 150 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (n).  See also Faure & Borre, supra note 143, at 241–42. 
 151 10 C.F.R. 140.91 (2016). 
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more than twenty (20) years after the date of the 
nuclear incident.152 
If the NRC does not declare an accident to be an ENO then 
claims are brought as normal under state law.  The NRC did not 
declare the Three Mile Island accident to have been an ENO and 
claimants needed to prove a breach of duty, but subsequently most 
states have imposed strict liability by statute.153 
The Price-Anderson Act requires nuclear operators to “have 
and maintain financial protection of such type and in such amounts” 
as the NRC requires, currently $375 million for reactors licensed to 
produce 100,000 kilowatts or more.154  Nuclear operators are also 
required to maintain secondary financial protection in the form of an 
industry retrospective rating plan in the event public liability from a 
single accident exceeds the primary coverage of the operator 
involved.155  The amount of this secondary coverage is a maximum 
of $95 million dollars per accident (adjusted for inflation), plus an 
additional 5% to cover legal costs. 156   The maximum amount of 
retroactive premium that can be assessed for a single accident is 
currently $121.255 million.157  At present there are 104 reactors in 
the pool, so there is the potential for a pool of about $12.61 billion 
per incident, which combined with the insurance policy of the 
operator creates a total pool of $ 12.985 billion.158  However, no 
operator will be required to pay more than an inflation adjusted $15 
million per year (currently $18.963 million).159  If the amount of 
claims in a given year exceeds the pool of funds available to pay such 
claims, the NRC will obtain funds from Congress or the Treasury to 
advance the amount of payable claims and later recover the amounts 
from the nuclear operators.160 
                                                                                                               
 152 Id. 
 153 Lerner & Tanzman, supra note 148, at 562–63. 
 154 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006); 10 C.F.R. 140.11(a)(4) (2016). 
 155 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b)(1). 
 156 42 U.S.C. §§ 2210(b)(1), (o)(1)(E). 
 157 10 C.F.R. 140.11(a)(4). 
 158 See Backgrounder on Nuclear Insurance and Disaster Relief, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. 
COMM’N (December 12, 2014), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/
nuclear-insurance.html [https://perma.cc/2693-2DKT]. 
 159 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b)(1); 10 C.F.R. 140.11(a)(4).  
 160 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b)(4). 
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If damages from a single accident exceed the two tiers of 
coverage then Congress shall review reports on the damages prepared 
by the by Secretary of Energy or the NRC and proposals for 
compensation plans prepared and submitted by the President and 
“take whatever action is determined to be necessary (including 
approval of appropriate compensation plans and appropriation of 
funds) to provide full and prompt compensation to the public for all 
public liability claims resulting from a disaster of such magnitude.”161  
While the provisions regarding the Executive Branch are binding, any 
action by Congress is totally discretionary.162 
The CSC was implemented with the Energy Independence 
and Security Act of 2007.163  No major changes were required to the 
Price-Anderson Act in order to implement the CSC.  The first tier of 
compensation required under the CSC is addressed by nuclear 
operator private insurance.  For incidents not covered by the Price-
Anderson Act, U.S. suppliers of nuclear technology would be 
required to bear the costs of any contribution to the fund because they 
“stand to benefit from the adoption of harmonized liability rules 
under the CSC.” 164   Funds normally available under the Price-
Anderson Act for incidents within its scope will be used to cover the 
costs of participating in the CSC system and nuclear suppliers will be 
required to cover the costs payable by the United States on account 
of being a party to the CSC for covered incidents outside the United 
States that are not within the scope of the Price-Anderson Act.165  
Funds made available to the United States under the CSC will be 
“used to satisfy public liability resulting from the Price-Anderson 
incident.” 166   The amount of public liability allowable will be 
increased by the amount of funds made available by the CSC 
international supplementary fund.167  Where suppliers are responsible 
for covering contributions to the international supplementary fund 
created under the CSC, the amount of the contribution will be 
assigned to individual suppliers based on a risk-informed assessment 
                                                                                                               
 161 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e), (i). 
 162 Lerner & Tanzman, supra note 148, at 565. 
 163 42 U.S.C. § 17001 (2007). 
 164 S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 109-15, supra note 3, at 7. 
 165 42 U.S.C. § 17373(c), (e) (2007). 
 166 42 U.S.C. § 17373(d)(1). 
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formula.168  The U.S. Treasury will pay the amount of contribution 
required for the international supplementary fund and will collect 
reimbursement from nuclear suppliers.169 
IV. JAPANESE NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION 
SYSTEM 
In Japan civil liability for nuclear damage is governed under 
the 1963 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage (ACND).170  The 
ACND states that its purpose is “to protect persons suffering from 
nuclear damage and to contribute to the sound development of the 
nuclear industry.”171  The ACND defines nuclear damage to mean 
“any damage caused by the effects of the fission process of nuclear 
fuel, or of the radiation from nuclear fuel etc., or of the toxic nature 
of such materials.”172  The compensation system established by the 
Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage is the exclusive remedy 
for nuclear damage,173  and the nuclear operator is solely liable for 
nuclear damage.174  Unlike in other systems, no limit is placed on the 
liability of nuclear operators.175  Strict liability for nuclear damage is 
imposed on nuclear operators except where the damage is caused by 
a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character or by an 
insurrection. 176   Where the damage is caused by a grave natural 
disaster of an exceptional character or by an insurrection the 
Government of Japan “shall take the necessary measures to relieve 
victims and to prevent the damage from spreading.” 177   Nuclear 
operators retain a right of recourse against a third party that where the 
nuclear operator has provided compensation for nuclear damage 
caused by the willful act of that third party.178 
                                                                                                               
 168 42 U.S.C. § 17373(e)(1)(C). 
 169 42 U.S.C. § 17373(h)(1). 
 170 ACND, supra note 10. 
 171 ACND, supra note 10, art. 1 
 172 ACND, supra note 10, art. 2, para. 2. 
 173 ACND, supra note 10, art. 4.  
 174 ACND, supra note 10, art. 4, para. 1. 
 175 ACND, supra note 10, art. 3–4; Eri Osaka, The Future of Nuclear Power in East 
Asia: Corporate Liability, Government Liability, and the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, 21 
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 433, 453 (2012). 
 176 ACND, supra note 10, art. 3, para. 1. 
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As there are no provisions altering the normal law on statutes 
of limitations in the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage 
plaintiffs are required to bring claims within three years of knowledge 
of the harm and the identity of the tortfeasor, but not later than twenty 
years from the date of the harm.179  This has been extended for toxic 
torts, however, such that victims simply must bring their claim within 
the three year period of prescription described above.180 
A nuclear operator must provide ¥ 120 billion of financial 
security either (a) by maintain a private insurance policy and an 
indemnity agreement for compensation of certain nuclear damage 
with the Government of Japan, (b) by providing a deposit of that 
amount, or (c) by other sufficient financial security approved by the 
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology 
(MEXT).181  Under the ACND the Government is required to provide 
such aid as is required for a nuclear operator to provide compensation 
for nuclear damage to the extent authorized to do so by the National 
Diet when the amount of compensation due for nuclear damage 
exceeds the financial security amount and when the Government 
“deems it necessary in order to attain the objectives of this Act.”182  
Liability insurance contracts for nuclear damage indemnify a nuclear 
operator for most loss arising from compensating nuclear damage.183  
Indemnity agreements for nuclear damage are agreements in which 
the Government of Japan indemnifies a nuclear operator for loss 
arising from compensating nuclear damage not covered by the 
liability insurance contract or other financial security for 
compensation of nuclear damage, such as damages due to normal 
operations, volcanos and earthquakes, and damages otherwise 
covered by private insurance but not claimed within ten years of the 
nuclear accident.184 
                                                                                                               
 179 Minpō ( ) [Civ. C.], Law No. 89 of 1896, art. 724 (Japan); Osaka, supra note 
175, at 449. 
 180 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Apr. 27, 2004, Hei 13 (uke) no. 1760, 58(4) Saikō 
Saibansho Minji Hanreishū [Minshū] 1032 (Japan); See also Osaka, supra note 175, at 449. 
 181 ACND, supra note 10, art. 7, para. 1. 
 182 ACND, supra note 10, art. 16. 
 183 ACND, supra note 10, art. 8. 
 184 ACND, supra note 10, art. 10; Genshiryoku Songai Baishō Hoshō Keiyaku ni 
kansuru Hōritsu ( ) [Act on Indemnity 
Agreements for the Compensation of Nuclear Damage], Law No. 148 of 1961, art. 2 (Japan), 
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In response to the multi-trillion yen damages caused by the 
Fukushima Daiichi incident, Japan passed the Nuclear Damage 
Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation Act in 
2011.185  The Act created a fund to provide aid to TEPCO, and other 
future nuclear operations that have liability for nuclear damage 
exceeding the amount of financial security required of them, so that 
it would be able to pay out all compensation for which it was liable 
rather than face liquidation due to the large amount of claims for 
nuclear damage. 186   The shareholders of the corporation are the 
Government of Japan and other non-governmental persons, including 
nuclear operators, though nuclear operators are not required to 
become shareholders.187  The current shareholders of the Corporation 
include the Government of Japan, which invested ¥ 7 billion, and 
nuclear operators including TEPCO, which also invested ¥ 7 
billion. 188   Under the Compensation Corporation Act nuclear 
operators pay annual premiums and will be able to request funds to 
pay compensation claims without any obligation to repay the 
Compensation Corporation.189  The Compensation Corporation may 
also provide additional assistance to nuclear operators, such as 
loans.190  Also, the Government is authorized to issue interest-free, 
non-transferable bonds to the corporation which can be redeemed to 
ensure availability of funds to provide financial assistance to a 
nuclear operator in the event of an accident that causes damages so 
large the Corporation does not have sufficient funds to provide aid to 
a nuclear operator. 191   A nuclear operator receiving financial 
assistance in this manner will be required to pay an additional 
contribution on top of its normal annual contribution.192  Where a 
                                                                                                               
 185 ACND, supra note 10, art. 16; Genshiryoku Songai Baishō Hairo Tō Shien Kikō Hō 
(  [Nuclear Damage Compensation and 
Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation Act] Law No. 94 of 2011, art. 2 (Japan), 
http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/H23/H23HO094.html [https://perma.cc/VN87-PTKN] 
[hereinafter Compensation Corporation Act]; see also Osaka, supra note 175, at 442. 
 186 Osaka, supra note 175, at 442. 
 187 Compensation Corporation Act, supra note 185, art. 4. 
 188 Kikō no Gaiyō ( ) [Summary of [the] Structure [of the Nuclear Damage 
Compensation and Facilitation Corporation], NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION AND 
FACILITATION CORPORATION, http://www.ndf.go.jp/soshiki/kikou_gaiyou.html [https://
perma.cc/2KL8-DBSH] (last visited Jan. 15, 2017). 
 189 Compensation Corporation Act, supra note 185, art. 38, 39, 41. 
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corporation receives aid in this manner it must prepare a “special 
business plan” jointly with the Corporation, which includes measures 
for rationalization of the nuclear operator’s operations.193 
Two laws were passed in 2014 in order to implement changes 
to Japanese law required for ratification of the CSC, the Act on 
Assistance, etc., for the Nuclear Damage Compensation Fund 
pursuant to the Implementation of the Convention on Supplementary 
Compensation for Nuclear Damage and the Act Amending Certain 
Provisions of the Act on Compensation of Nuclear Damage and the 
Act on Indemnity Agreements for the Compensation of Nuclear 
Damage.194 
Under the CSC Assistance Act, the Government will provide 
financial assistance to a nuclear operator where the amount of nuclear 
damages suffered in the territory of a party to the CSC or suffered by 
a national of a party to the CSC is above 300 million SDR when 
jurisdiction over the claim lies with the courts of Japan. 195   The 
amount of aid is the lesser of the amount of compensation payable by 
a nuclear operator under the CSC in excess of 300 million SDR and 
the amount payable by Japan as its contribution to the international 
supplementary compensation fund, plus interest and costs.196  The 
Government collects regular annual deposits of ¥170,400,000 from 
                                                                                                               
 193 Compensation Corporation Act, supra note 185, art. 45. 
 194 Genshiryoku Songai no Hokantekina Hoshō ni kansuru Jōyaku no Jisshi ni tomonau 
Genshiryoku Songai Baishō Shikin no Hojo Tō ni kansuru Hōritsu (
) [Act 
on Assistance, etc., for the Nuclear Damage Compensation Fund pursuant to the 
Implementation of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage], 
Law No. 133 of 2014 (Japan) [hereinafter CSC Assistance Act]; Genshiryoku Songai no 
Baishō ni kansuru Hōritsu oyobi Genshiryoku Songai Baishō Hoshō Keiyaku ni kansuru 
Hōritsu no Ichibu wo Kaisei suru Hōritsu (
 ([Act Amending Certain 
Provisions of the Act on Compensation of Nuclear Damage and the Act on Indemnity 
Agreements for the Compensation of Nuclear Damage], Law No. 134 of 2014 (Japan), 
http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_housei.nsf/html/housei/18720141128134.htm 
[https://perma.cc/JMY9-R2J2] [hereinafter CSC Amendments Act]. 
 195 CSC Assistance Act, supra note 194, art. 3; Genshiryoku Songai no Hokantekina 
Hoshō ni kansuru Jōyaku no Jisshi ni tomonau Gensiryoku Songai Baishō Shikin no Hojo 
Tō ni kansuru Hōritsu Shikōrei (
) [Cabinet Order Implementing 
the Act on Assistance, etc., for the Nuclear Damage Compensation Fund pursuant to the 
Implementation of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage], 
Cabinet Order No. 173 of 2015 (Japan), http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/H27/H27SE173.
html [https://perma.cc/33CG-JZUA] [hereinafter CSC Assistance Act Cabinet Order]. 
 196 CSC Assistance Act Cabinet Order, supra note 195, art. 2.  
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nuclear operators for the purpose of satisfying any obligation under 
the CSC to make a contribution to the international supplementary 
fund.197  The Government will also collect a special deposit from a 
nuclear operator equal to the amount required as a contribution to the 
international supplementary compensation fund by Japan.198 
The changes to Japanese law under the CSC Amendments Act 
to bring Japanese law with the Annex of the CSC were minimal as 
Japanese law largely was largely already in conformance.  The most 
significant change is that after the amendment operators have a right 
of recourse only when nuclear damage was caused by the willful act 
of a natural person, not any third party as under previous law, or 
where there is express provision for a right of recourse in a written 
agreement.199 
V. ANALYSIS OF THE CSC’S PROVISIONS 
Having previously noted how low membership in the CSC 
limits its utility, this section will analyze how well the provisions of 
the CSC accomplish their objectives of ensuring adequate victim 
compensation while shielding nuclear operators from unsustainable 
levels of potential liability, in particular regarding the largest users of 
nuclear power in the CSC, the United States and Japan.  As described 
above, the CSC follows prior practice in the Paris and Vienna 
Conventions of applying strict and exclusive liability for nuclear 
operators, employing these same core mechanisms to shield the 
nuclear industry as a whole from liability and concentrating it on the 
nuclear operator.  The CSC was formulated to address criticisms of 
the original Paris and Vienna Conventions regarding low liability 
limits, the lack of a supplementary compensation fund, short statutes 
of limitations, overly restrictive types of covered damages, and 
limited territorial scope.200  The CSC is the implementation of the 
need for a supplementary compensation fund.  This section will 
examine several critiques of the CSC involving: definition of 
damages, limitations on liability, legal channeling, statutes of 
                                                                                                               
 197 CSC Assistance Act, supra note 194, art. 4; CSC Assistance Act Cabinet Order, 
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limitations, and jurisdiction over claims.  This paper argues that the 
CSC will likely prove to have little impact on domestic victims in 
either the United States or Japan because it does not substantially 
increase the amount of compensation available or make 
compensation particularly easier to obtain.  The CSC would, however, 
improve the availability of compensation in many nations 
considering nuclear power that currently heavily limit industry 
liability. 
A. Definition of Damages 
Under the original Paris and Vienna Conventions nuclear 
damages were restricted to loss of life, personal injury and damage to 
property.201 The Revised Vienna Convention and the CSC greatly 
expanded the definition of nuclear damages to include a variety of 
economic and environmental damages to the extent allowed by the 
law of the competent court as described above. 202   Despite this 
expanded definition, critics of the CSC and the other Conventions 
attack the definition of damages for being overly restrictive, and, in 
the case of Japan, are concerned that ratification of the CSC will 
eliminate several types of damage currently included in compensable 
damages.203 
As Japanese law currently allows all damages proved to be 
caused by a nuclear accident, the more restrictive CSC definition does 
somewhat limit compensable damages.204  The Japan Federation of 
Bar Associations is specifically concerned that the CSC definition 
does not explicitly include emotional damages or damages from 
harmful rumors.205  While the CSC definition does not specifically 
include rumor damages, scholarly consensus is that both of these 
types of damage will still be included in cases subject to Japanese law.  
Japanese jurisprudence allows for the compensation of pure 
economic damages without any harm to person or property, such as 
so called rumor damages, “where the desire of a consumer or business 
partner to avoid [doing business with the plaintiff] out of concern for 
the danger of contamination by radioactive substances on account of 
                                                                                                               
 201 Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 1; Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 1(j). 
 202 CSC, supra note 1, art. 1(f)(iii–vii). 
 203 Currie, supra note 4, at 85; August 2014 JFBA opinion, at 1. 
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the present accident is deemed reasonable by the standard of an 
average or regular person.” 206   The CSC definition of nuclear 
damages leaves room for claims brought under Japanese law to 
include rumor damages in the scope of compensable damages in 
under art. I(f)(vii) (“any other economic loss, other than any caused 
by the impairment of the environment, if permitted by the general law 
on civil liability of the competent court”).207 
Regarding emotional harms, the fact that the CSC includes 
personal injury in the definition of nuclear damage while the other 
conventions on the compensation of nuclear damage refer to bodily 
injury could be interpreted to mean that the more expansive term 
personal injury is intended to include both purely physical harms and 
emotional harms.208 
In addition, some argue that damages should be further 
expanded to include rumor damages even where no measurable 
radioactivity has been released,209 and fully integrate economic and 
environmental damages regardless of the law of the competent 
court.210  Others criticize the CSC definition for being too broad, 
saying that including pure economic damages in the scope of nuclear 
damages makes it harder for victims that suffered personal injury or 
property damage to recover the full amount of recoverable damages 
unless the financial resources of the nuclear operator are unlimited.211 
                                                                                                               
 206 Otsuka Tadashi ( ), Fukushima Dai’ichi Genshiryoku Hatsudensho Jiko ni 
yoru Songai Baishō ( ) [Compensation for 
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants Accident], in Shinsai Genpatsu Jiko to 
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In summary, the definition of damages of the CSC and the 
Revised Vienna Convention is much more protective of victims than 
the definition currently used in the un-amended Paris Convention, 
though the range of compensable damages could be further expanded, 
and concerns about reduced coverage in Japan are largely unfounded. 
B. Limitations on Liability 
Limits on liability have been put in place to prevent nuclear 
operators from shouldering the full cost of insuring their liabilities 
and inability to compensate any damages due to bankruptcy. 212  
These limitations on the liability of nuclear operators have a 
distorting effect because they allow nuclear operators to avoid fully 
internalizing the costs of their operations. 213  Nevertheless, it is 
unlikely that international agreements can raise the minimum limits 
on the amount of compensation to a level that would ensure full 
compensation of the largest nuclear accidents and that this can be 
addressed mainly through national law.  While the 1990s era 
Conventions with minimum liability amounts of 300 million SDR 
would be sufficient to cover an accident the size of the Three Mile 
Island accident with damages of $70 million,214 the Conventions have 
been roundly criticized for adopting minimum compensation 
amounts that are substantially lower than would be required to 
actually compensate a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl or 
Fukushima. 215   The World Health Organization estimates the 
damages from Chernobyl will be in the range of hundreds of billions 
of dollars, though notes that the amount is not possible to accurately 
calculate.216  Damages from Fukushima have already exceeded ¥ 4 
trillion.217 
                                                                                                               
 212 Currie, supra note 4, at 91. 
 213 Faure & Borre, supra note 143, at 264.  
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Limitations on the monetary amount of damages and the 
plaintiffs who are allowed to bring claims have increased from the 
Paris Convention’s upper limit of $15 million to a first tier of at least 
300 million SDR and a second tier of up to 300 million SDR in the 
CSC and Revised Vienna Convention. 218   However, this is still 
considerably lower than the $12.9 billion available in the United 
States. 219   Japan has an unlimited liability system, but even the 
primary insurance requirement of ¥ 120 billion is considerably higher 
than the CSC minimum amount.220  Above that amount compensation 
is addressed through direct government aid or through the 
Compensation Corporation in the form of payouts and loans.221  The 
Revised Paris Convention proposed to increase the minimum limit on 
liability to € 700 million, and combined with the Revised Brussels 
Supplementary Convention the total amount of available funds would 
have been € 1.5 billion, but there is no sign that this will be ratified at 
any point.222 
Industry groups are very much in favor of limited liability, 
and in Japan are pushing for a change from unlimited to limited 
liability, saying that industry and the public should share the risks of 
nuclear power and that unlimited liability will prevent full 
compensation of damages.223  However limitations on liability should 
only be necessary if nuclear operators are poorly capitalized and are 
unable to shoulder the increase in insurance costs under an unlimited 
liability system.224  Furthermore this punishes the victims of nuclear 
accidents not the party that caused the accident.225  Indeed, the trend 
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has been for states to move away from limited liability, beginning 
with Germany in 1985.226  However at the urging of industry groups, 
Japan is considering moving the opposite direction to transition from 
unlimited liability to either a limited liability system or imposing a 
statutory cap on liability above which the government will provide 
compensation as a reaction to the massive costs imposed by the 
Fukushima accident.227  One interesting proposal is to add a second 
layer of coverage based on the Price-Anderson model of retroactive 
premiums, but making the amount of the fund scalable up to ¥ 3 
trillion to ¥ 4 trillion above which the government would be 
responsible for providing compensation.228  Critics of Japan’s current 
system, such as Prof. Urakawa, note that unlike other unlimited 
liability systems, Japan does not have clear rules on when 
government assistance will be provided, impeding risk 
management. 229   He notes that the current system based on the 
Compensation Corporation creates a never ending compensation 
process that holds back the recovery of both victims and TEPCO and 
other members of the nuclear industry.230 
While the CSC’s minimum liability amounts are lower than 
those in the United States and Japan, other Asian countries at present 
limit liability to less than the CSC minimum amount.  For example, 
China, which Japan has encouraged to join the CSC,231 only provides 
800 million RMB of coverage, though additional indemnity may be 
provided for an extraordinary nuclear accident.232  Adoption of the 
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CSC would require increases in the amount of damages nuclear 
operators are liable for and would in that sense increase the amount 
of compensation available to potential victims. 
Furthermore, the CSC provides for two exceptions to liability 
for nuclear operators: for nuclear damage directly due to an act of 
armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection and for damage 
directly due to a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character, 
except where the law of the installation state provides otherwise.233  
The exception for grave natural disasters of an exceptional character 
has been removed from the Revised Paris and Vienna Conventions.234  
This provision obstructs victim compensation for what could be the 
most damaging nuclear accidents to the extent the government does 
not provide compensation in place of the nuclear operator.235  In the 
United States, the Price-Anderson Act specifically requires nuclear 
operators to waive force majeure defenses to liability. 236   Japan 
however grants an exception to liability for grave natural disasters of 
an exceptional character.237  However, the bar for how uncommon the 
disaster must is quite high, with the standard being something in the 
range of completely unimaginable. 238   This rather restricts the 
applicability of this provision, and even the 2011 Great East Japan 
Earthquake was determined to not meet this standard.239 
Despite the disadvantages of limited liability, international 
agreements are not likely to be a successful method of addressing the 
issue.  Potential state parties are simply unlikely to be willing to 
change their policy through international dialogue.  Progress has been 
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seen is in the removal of the exception for grave natural disasters of 
an exceptional character and the CSC has a substantially greater 
minimum liability amount, but the Revised Vienna Convention was 
only ratified by 13 of the 40 Vienna Convention parties.240  The 
purpose of international agreements on liability for nuclear damages 
is to coordinate jurisdiction and ensure coverage of transnational 
damages.241  While in regions like Europe with many small countries 
closely packed together there is a greater risk of transboundary 
damages, victims in the United States or Japan are far more likely to 
be injured in purely domestic accidents.  For them, limits on liability 
are above all a matter for domestic discussion.  Furthermore, Japan 
has managed to provide compensation far beyond the amount of 
financial security required of nuclear operators through the 
innovative, if perhaps clunky, system of the Compensation 
Corporation.  The effects of nuclear damages are primarily felt in 
relatively close proximity to the site of the accident.  Pressure to 
ensure adequate compensation should therefore be strongest 
domestically. 
C. Legal Channeling 
Further innovations should be expected at the level of 
domestic law.  While legal channeling is the norm internationally, it 
is not an efficient way of compensating victims.  Legal channeling is 
yet another way in which the nuclear industry, in particular 
manufacturers, shields itself from liability and avoids economically 
efficient internalization of costs.242  While legal channeling decreases 
the administrative costs of concurrent lawsuits, it does not outweigh 
the benefits to efficiency of allowing a victim to sue all possible 
parties for a given harm.243  The economic channeling used in the 
United States is more efficient because it reduces administrative costs 
by requiring operators to include all possible third parties into the 
operator’s coverage while still allowing victims to choose from the 
full range of possible defendants.244  The United States long rejected 
joining any Convention which would have required it to abandon 
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economic channeling.245  The CSC is therefore the better option for 
the United States as compared to the Paris Convention or Vienna 
Convention, which would have required the United States to adopt 
economic channeling.  Unfortunately, this exception to the 
requirement of implementing legal channeling is part of the CSC’s 
provisions exempting the United States from certain requirements 
with which national legislation must conform.246  This does little 
good for other parties to the CSC. 
D. Statute of Limitations 
Another criticism of the CSC is that its statute of limitations 
is too short for the radiological harms caused by nuclear damage and 
that time limits on the bringing of claims should be eliminated 
entirely.247  The CSC requires that states implement law requiring 
claims be brought within three years of knowledge of the harm and 
identity of the tortfeasor but not longer than 10 years, however if 
under national law the liability of the operator is covered by insurance 
or other financial security for a longer period, then the statute of 
limitations can be extended correspondingly.248  This is shorter than 
provided for under U.S. law (20 years) or Japanese law (20 years by 
statute, but courts have extended this as noted above). 249   For 
comparison, the Revised Paris and Vienna Conventions extend their 
statute of limitations all the way to 30 years.250  While the statute of 
limitations in the CSC is shorter than is provided for under U.S. or 
Japanese law, this provision will have no effect on the United States 
or Japan because the financial security requirements cover longer 
periods. 
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E. Jurisdiction over Claims 
Another major criticism of the CSC and the other 
Conventions is that they provide for exclusive jurisdiction over 
claims in the courts of the country in which they occurred. 251  
Criticism of this provision focuses on two matters.  First, some, such 
as the JFBA, see this as disadvantaging victims in countries such as 
Japan that would need to pursue claims in distant countries which 
may have only the minimum provisions required under the CSC.252  
In advanced countries, such as the United States and Japan, legal 
protections are substantially stronger than the minimum provisions 
required by international treaty.  The situation in developing 
countries is rather different as illustrated in the discussion of 
limitations on damages. 
Second some, such as Prof. Currie, criticize the lack of neutral 
tribunals. 253   The CSC and other agreements require that 
compensation be provided without discrimination on the basis of 
nationality, domicile or residence.254  Prof. Currie is concerned about 
forcing victims to sue in a court of a state economically linked to its 
own nuclear industry.255  He further argues for the application of the 
law of the place in which the damage occurred, not where the accident 
took place, because it is clear that there is a risk of damage in distant 
locations and victims are justified in relying on the safety standards 
of their own country.256 
On the other hand, it can also be noted, perhaps rather 
cynically, that from the perspective of a country like Japan which is 
more likely to be the location of an accident than a victim of 
transnational damage from a neighbor,257 it may be beneficial to be 
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protected by provisions that require that claims be brought in your 
own courts. 
VI. REFORM EFFORTS 
In 2012 the IAEA’s International Expert Group on Nuclear 
Liability (INLEX) made recommendations on how the international 
community should adjust the system for compensating nuclear 
damages in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident.258  The report 
strongly recommended that states with nuclear reactors ratify at least 
one of the Conventions, and encouraged states with no reactors to 
consider joining a Convention to receive the benefits of ensuring 
compensation for transnational nuclear damage. 259   The report 
specifically recommended that states with nuclear installations ensure 
the availability of funds to compensate all victims of a nuclear 
incident, without discrimination.  Such states should: “establish 
compensation and financial security amounts significantly higher 
than the minimum amounts envisaged under the existing instruments,” 
“undertake regular reviews of the adequacy of compensation 
amounts . . . ,”  “undertake regular reviews of the adequacy of 
financial security amounts . . . ,” “be prepared to set up alternative 
funding mechanisms where the amount of damage exceeds the 
available compensation and financial security,” “provide 
compensation for latent injuries, “ “ensure that compensation is 
available in the case of an incident directly due to a grave natural 
disaster of an exceptional character,” and “ensure that all claims from 
a nuclear disaster are dealt with in a single forum in a prompt, 
equitable, and non-discriminatory manner with minimal 
litigation . . . .”260 
These recommendations address the issues with the 
provisions of the CSC raised in this paper.  Monetary limits on 
liability have gradually increased but are still insufficient to cover a 
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large accident.  Concerns remain about the advisability of allowing 
national courts to adjudicate claims where the nuclear industry is a 
major stakeholder in the national economy.  This paper has discussed 
how the international forum is not the best place to assure 
compensation to all domestic victims of a nuclear accident, though it 
is the only way to assure compensation to victims of nuclear damage 
caused by an accident in a foreign country.  We have seen that Japan 
had to enact extraordinary measures to assure compensation for the 
Fukushima accident because it only required ¥ 120 billion of financial 
security despite the unlimited liability faced by its nuclear operators.  
However, Japan successfully innovated to develop a novel method 
for compensating the victims of the Fukushima accident.  These 
recommendations, however, show no indication that there will be any 
change to the use of legal channeling. 
In conclusion, in the existing treaties the protection of the 
nuclear industry from liability is prioritized over ensuring adequate 
victim compensation.  However, the issue of civil liability for nuclear 
damages, in particular transnational damages, is likely to become 
more pressing.  At present, there are 60 new nuclear reactors under 
construction, half of which are in Asia.261  Of these, 20 are in China, 
which is not party to any of the Conventions, has most of its 
provisions on compensation for nuclear damage only in 
administrative law, and provides for only minimal amounts of 
operator liability as compared to the CSC or Revised Vienna 
Convention.262  Innovation on the international stage has tended to 
follow major accidents.  There can be little question that there will be 
future accidents.  We shall see how the current framework holds up 
and evolves should there be another accident like Chernobyl with 
substantial transnational damages. 
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